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MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : CIA/ACDA Relations

I have been giving some thought to our approach to the disarmament problem in general and ACDA in particular and have the following suggestions and comments to make:

a. Mr. [] should continue to be your alternate and chief staff officer in connection with the Committee of Principals.

b. Mr. [] should represent the Agency in our routine relations with ACDA, especially in connection with handling ACDA intelligence requirements. Mr. [] will undertake his responsibilities, in addition to his other duties, as a member of my immediate staff.

(1) A statement of Mr. [] background and experience is attached as Tab A.

(2) A draft of an Agency notice designating Mr. [] as the Agency's representative for disarmament is attached as Tab B. — Signed by DDCI. Returned to AFI for follow up.

c. I would suggest that you meet with Mr. Foster fairly soon to discuss the general problems of disarmament and intelligence. We have set a few things in motion (e.g., scheduling briefings of the various Assistant Directors on the Agency's activities, capabilities, and limitations in the field of disarmament and a more systematic review of ACDA's research proposals), but I think a tour d'horizon between you and Mr. Foster would be useful. In any case, there is one important loose end that should be taken care of: in your last letter to Foster (25 April and attached as Tab C) you stressed your desire to have the CIA represent the community in its dealings with ACDA. It is my understanding that you now feel that, while our man can be a channel to DIA and INR if Mr. Foster so desires, [] principal responsibility would be in connection with

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CIA-ACDA relations. I personally agree with this view and I believe that Mr. Foster would find this very acceptable. A letter from you to Foster along these lines is attached as Tab D.



RAY S. CLINE
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

STAT

Enclosures:
Tabs A, B, C, D

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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR

Noted by Dcl.
WELDER

MAY 26 1963

Dear John:

Thank you for your letter of April 25 containing a summary of your understanding of the results of our discussion on April 17, and containing also an expression of the desire of the intelligence community to afford the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) all possible cooperation. In the last paragraph of your letter you indicated that you would be pleased to discuss these matters further after we had considered the points in your letter.

We appreciate your appointing a liaison officer to this Agency--Mr. []--and we have had the pleasure of meeting him.

With respect to ACDA representation on the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) committees, we agree that ACDA representatives should appear before the committees or the Board itself when matters of special interest to ACDA are up for consideration and that this can be best arranged by Mr. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State (INR) whom we consider to be our representative on the USIB.

In view of the fact that Mr. Hughes is our representative on USIB, we believe that it would be best if he were considered to be the channel of contact with

respect to

The Honorable
John A. McCone,
Director of Central Intelligence.

GROUP 3

Downgraded at 12 year
intervals; not
automatically declassified

(EXECUTIVE REGISTRY FILE)

US-ACDA

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respect to USIB and the levying of ACDA intelligence requirements on the intelligence community as a whole. As you are aware, there is an ACDA support unit in the Department of State (INR) to handle sensitive intelligence for ACDA. Likewise, we had previously made arrangements with INR whereby ACDA would have a liaison officer to INR. It is our hope that the appointment of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) liaison officer would not affect these previous arrangements.

With reference to the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), it had been our feeling based on a year's experience that if ACDA might have liaison officers from DIA, CIA, and INR who are intimately knowledgeable both of their respective organizations' capabilities and of ACDA's needs, that this plus the INR channel to the Community would be the best means for servicing ACDA's numerous intelligence requirements. However, in view of the recent conversations between you and Secretary Gilpatric, we are perfectly willing to use the CIA liaison officer [] as the channel for transmitting major ACDA requests to DIA as well as CIA. At the same time, we would assume that this would not obviate direct personal contact between ACDA and DIA on matters of routine or minor importance. We have discussed this arrangement with Mr. Hughes and he finds it entirely satisfactory.

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Sincerely,

William C. Foster
William C. Foster
(by C.E. Burger)
(in his absence.)

Copies to:

The Honorable Roswell L. Gilpatric, Department of Defense
The Honorable Thomas L. Hughes, Department of State

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ILLEGIB

ER 63-3432

(This letter is in response to : TS 188261, 18 Feb; ER 63-1388, 8 Feb;
and ER 63-2878, 8 Apr)

25 April 1963

The Honorable William C. Foster
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Bill:

In this letter I will attempt to summarize my understanding of the results of our discussion on April 17th, and in doing so, answer your letter to me of February 8th and April 8th, and Adrian Fisher's letter of February 18th. The topics and ideas covered by these letters have, as indicated by you, been the subject of several discussions between representatives of our respective organizations.

First, I would like to repeat that the intelligence community, and most particularly CIA and DIA (as they are most directly concerned with your problems), desire to afford the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency all possible cooperation. We appreciate that our intelligence findings and analysis have an important bearing on your activities. ✓

We feel it is not practical to place a permanent representative on your staff as no one man has knowledge of all the phases of the intelligence community's activities and, therefore, would be unable to properly serve your requirements. Likewise, it is not practical to set up a special unit in CIA to deal with ACDA's requirements as your requirements reach into most of CIA's divisions and, therefore, such a unit would have to include at least one representative from a great number of our departments or divisions. ✓

In addition, it is my belief and this has been concurred in by Secretary Gilpatric, that there should be one focal point in the intelligence community as a liaison between the community and ACDA and that this point can best be set up in the Central Intelligence Agency. ✓

U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency

With this in mind, I am appointing a Liaison officer with appropriate staff assistance in CIA. I will so inform the United States Intelligence Board. He will be authorized to call upon all members of the community as well as all divisions and departments of CIA as appropriate to the extent necessary to meet your requirements. ✓

The Liaison officer will be charged with the responsibility of serving your needs promptly so that delays which you have experienced in the past can be avoided. I think this arrangement should meet your requirements. The establishment of a USIB committee on ACDA matters as proposed in your letter presents difficulties because of your manifold needs. Your requirements do not present a parallel situation to JAEIC or GMAIC for they are involved in a very specific area of intelligence activity whereas your requirements range over a very broad field of intelligence reporting and analysis. ✓

With respect to the ACDA representation on USIB committees such as JAEIC or GMAIC, or on USIB itself, it is my feeling that this would involve an extravagant waste of talent on your part for these committees are involved in a vast number of problems which are of no particular interest to ACDA. A better procedure is for ACDA to appear before the committees or the Board itself when matters of special interest to ACDA are up for consideration. This can be arranged by Mr. Hughes, Director of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State, who sits on USIB and has representatives on all of the committees and, therefore, can decide the circumstances under which ACDA representation should be called in. This, incidentally, is a procedure we follow in a great many departments of the Government that have a particular knowledge and special interest in a problem that may be brought before the Board or one of its committees.

With respect to the suggestions made in Mr. Fisher's letter that USIB make judgments on the range of probable error in estimates of Soviet capability, order of battle, quantity of military items, etc., I am at a loss to understand just what USIB could do along this line which would be constructive. What is asked by Mr. Fisher is that "...in addition to commenting on the range of probable error, the intelligence community might also...indicate their degree of confidence that the estimates are not grossly in error....ACDA will, in addition, require an estimate of range of error or total inventories as well."

USIB regularly produces estimates of Soviet capabilities, order of battle, military inventories, etc., and these are under constant review and are revised from time to time as new dependable intelligence develops. In many instances, members of the community differ in these evaluations and it is my practice to set out the dissenting views in footnotes to the estimates. Some estimates are based on very hard intelligence. Others are arrived at by a synthesis of all available intelligence, a great deal of which cannot be evaluated as being "hard." The information on which the final conclusions are based is carefully studied by the intelligence community and the estimates reflect the degree of certainty which we have in our conclusions. Certainly no estimates are produced which are "grossly in error" nor is it practical to develop what is referred to as an "estimate of the probable error." When there is doubt, the estimate contains a range, or is otherwise qualified. When new information indicates that the range is not correct, a revised estimate is produced. I frankly do not see how we can go further.

One point I must add is to emphasize the very great difficulty of developing the rate of production of military items, and in the case of some items, the total inventory. As an example, we feel we know with reasonable assurances the MRBM, IRBM, and ICBM launchers in the Soviet Union. Also, we know something of their military doctrine concerning the "reloading of the pads." However, we do not know the number of missiles in existence, nor the rate of production. The same is true of a great many other military items. Hence, it is not practical to proceed on any basis of destroying end items and then reaching a conclusion of what is left by the process of subtraction. What is necessary and appears to me indispensable if we are to pursue a safe course is an arrangement which would provide for the inspection of both the destroyed items and the remaining inventory.

With respect to the final question raised by Mr. Fisher, which is the extent to which intelligence can contribute to the inspection provisions of a treaty, I feel that this is a matter which should be very intensively studied by your staff and appropriate representatives of the intelligence community. Intelligence can make a real contribution in this area. Advantage should be taken of the potential of the intelligence community, not only with respect to gathering information but more particularly with regard to the intelligence processes used in arriving at a reasonable and dependable quantitative analysis.

In studying this we must always look to the permanence of intelligence sources. Many of them are subject to compromise, and once compromised, as in the case of press leaks, they disappear. It seems to me that proven intelligence processes of analysis and estimates and the community's customary practice of drawing a reasonable conclusion from a synthesis of a wide spectrum of information is the most useful contribution the community can make to your problem.

I will be pleased to discuss this matter further with you after you have considered the points in this letter.

Sincerely,

John A. McCone
Director

JAM/bd (19 Apr 63)

Coordinated with Mr. [] Dr. Kent, Mr. Sheldon

Orig &X - Addressee (1 - General Carroll) (General Carroll concurred on the above on 26 April 1963)

1 - DCI Chrono

1 - DCI alpha

① ER with basic letters

1 - DD/I - Mr. Sheldon

1 - Mr. []

(26 April)

Mr. Sheldon mentioned that the letter could be held until Monday 29 April before delivery.

APR 23 1963